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Introduction
It is well known that the set of unblocked allocations, the core, and
the set of Walras allocations coincide in an atomless economy when
all measurable coalitions are allowed to form. Clearly, if only a subset
of the set of all coalitions is allowed to form, the set of unblocked
allocations enlarges, and generally we can merely say that this larger
set contains the set of Walrasian allocations.
In reality the lack of communication restricts the set of coalitions
that can be formed. The purpose of our work is investigate the Core-
Walras equivalence by imposing to the set of all coalitions some restric-
tions.
The notion of the core is based on the premise that any group
of agents can cooperate and agree upon a coordinated set of actions
which can then be enforced. In the context of a differential information
economy, an allocation should be seen as a state-contingent allocation
satisfying physical resource constraints in each information state. A
central role is played by the information set of each agent. Agents
which enter into a coalition contract at the ex-ante stage, i.e. before
any agents receives private information, or at the interim, i.e. after
each agent has received her private information. It is well known that
the ex-post stage, i.e. decisions are made after the information state
is known, is no different from a model with complete information. An
appropriate notion of the core must take into account of whether the
coalition decisions stage is ex-ante or interim.
The definition of cooperative solution concept, the core, differs with
the information sharing rule used by agents in a coalition. In an econ-
omy with differential information, the set of allocation that a coalition
can block depends upon the initial information and the communication
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opportunities of the members of a coalition.
In the main literature, there are three kinds of information sharing
rule in a coalition:
i) pooling information, introduced by Wilson [50], that is an alter-
native allocation that a coalition prefer must be enforced in an
event which they all can discern;
ii) private information, introduced first by Yannelis [51], such that
the set of feasible allocations for a blocking coalition must involve
a net trade of each member of the coalition that is measurable
with respect to his information partition;
iii) common knowledge information, that is net trades are measurable
with respect to the joint partition of all members of the coalition
and agents can discern only the events in the fine field.
Both with the coarse and fine core problems arises associated with
existence and incentive compatibility. On the contrary, it has been
shown that if the economy has a finite number of traders, the private
core has some interesting properties: it exists under standard continu-
ity and concavity assumptions on utility functions, it is coalitionally
incentive, i.e. there is truthful revelation of information in each coali-
tion, and it takes into account the information superiority of traders.
From the non cooperative side, we deal with two main equilibrium
concepts:
iv) the rational expectations equilibrium which is an interim concept
in which prices are referred to as signals reflecting and transferring
information;
v) the competitive private equilibrium, which is closer to the Walrasian
equilibrium notion in the deterministic case: this non-cooperative
solution concept presumes that agents maximize their ex-ante ex-
pected utility subject to their budget constraint in which infor-
mation constraints, besides the classical ones, are considered.
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In Rational expectations equilibria prices do not reflect the informa-
tion asymmetries among agents. More precisely, assuming that each
agent makes her consumption decisions according to rules which use
whatever private information is available when the market takes place,
one would expect equilibrium prices to depend on the state of the world
and to reflect some or all of the prior private information possessed by
agents.
On the contrary, competitive private equilibria exist for finite economies
under the standard assumptions which guarantee the existence of Wal-
rasian equilibria.
We will consider a differential information exchange economy ob-
tained by introducing in the classical Arrow-Debreu model both un-
certainty and asymmetries in information. In these model, uncertainty
is exogenous and is represented by a measure space (Ω,F) where Ω
denotes the finite set of all possible states of nature and F is the set of
all possible events.
We will assume that agents make coalitional decisions at the ex-ante
stage but each agent receives private information which is not publicly
verifiable before consumption takes place. In particular, agents trades
with the anonymous market rather than with other agents directly and
it becomes very natural to require that agents’ trade be measurable
with respect to their private information. This notion of the core, the
Private Core, was first introduced and studied by Allen [4], Yannelis
[51], Koutsougheras and Yannelis [36].
In Section 3.4, we briefly consider the interim stage of coalitions
formation. We will refer to Wilson [50] model, in which the utility
function is the conditional expected utility function. We will consider
the restriction that objections be coordinated on a common knowledge
event. In this case, we will refer to the concept of Fine Core.
We characterize in terms of decentralizing prices several notions of
core allocations resulting from different possible restrictions imposed
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to the set of blocking coalitions. Reciprocal relations among cores are
also studied.
It is shown by Scmeidler [45] that if in an atomless pure exchange
economy, for arbitrary ² > 0, only coalitions with measure less than
² are allowed to form, we still have the identity between the set of
unblocked allocations and the set of Walras allocation.
Furthermore, Grodal [27] has shown that if the coalitions which are
allowed to form consists of relatively ”‘few”’ agents, and that agents in
the coalition are ² similar, then the core-Walras equivalence still holds.
Finally, in Vind [49] shows that if the allocation is determined by
a vote among the traders, the only allocations for which we will not
have few agents suggesting and voting for some other allocation are the
competitive allocations.
Mas Colell [38] has attempted to give some economic interpretation
of this results. Specifically, he argued that we need not tether (link)
ourselves to credulity-stretching informational requirements of the ide-
alized notion of free Edgeworthian recontract. If whatever can be done
by a coalition, can be done by any arbitrarily small coalition, then one
only needs a few well informed people to take us to Walrasian equi-
librium. He also suggests that we think of these few as arbitrageurs.
With the rest of people in the economy remaining passive, it is enough
for this small, profit seeking group to do their duty and take us to
equilibrium.
Another issue we have investigated in our work, starting from the
reality restrictions of coalitions due by various rules imposed over the
society (i.e. information, transportation, legal and institutional con-
straints), is the number and composition of the set of blocking coali-
tions.
The more general treatment of the problem under smoothness as-
sumption for large finite pure exchange economies has been provided
by Mas-Colell [37], who showed that nearly half of all coalitions block
a Pareto optimal allocation which is “bounded away from being Wal-
v
rasian”. Since Pareto optimality of a given allocation rules out the
possibility of being blocked by a coalition as well as its complement,
the 50% of all coalitions represents an upper bound on the number of
blocking coalitions.
Thus, the result of Mas-Colell [37], implies that if the number of
individuals in an economy rises, the proportion of blocking coalitions
within the entire set of coalitions would approach this upper bound.
The result of Mas-Colell [37] can be restated in an alternative man-
ner: if one puts the uniform distribution on the space of two coalition
partitions of the set of all individuals and chooses such a partition
at random, then with probability one it contains a blocking coalition.
This conclusion has been generalized by Greenberg and Weber [25] who
considered partitions of all individuals into several coalitions. Under
the uniform distribution on the set of partitions that contain a given
number J ≥ 2 of coalitions, Greenberg and Weber [25] show that the
probability of such a partition to contain a coalition that blocks a given
non-Walrasian allocation, is arbitrarily close to one. The extension of
this result is shown in Section 3.5
Shitovitz [47] initiated the study of the number or the measure of
blocking coalitions in atomless economies. He analyzed economies with
a finite number of types and identified a coalition with its profile. By
considering profiles that represents coalitions with the same propor-
tion of types as in the whole economy, Shitovitz [47] proved a local
result, that for every equal treatment Pareto optimal allocation which
is not Walrasian, there is a ball in the type profile space around the
given type profile so that nearly half of the profiles in the ball are block-
ing. Following the Shitovitz’s approach, Graziano [23] investigated this
problem in atomless economies with a continuum of commodities.
The work is organized as follows.
In Section 2.1, we formulate and extend results of Okuda and Shi-
tovitz [39] in a differential information framework. Then, we can classi-
fying core allocations with respect to the family of all coalitions that in-
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clude one of the members of partition. Specifically, for a given coalition
R, we consider the allocation that cannot be blocked by any coalition
that includes (or exclude) R.
Starting from a finite partition P of the whole set of agents, we
classify the core allocations with respect to the family of all coalitions
that include one of the members of the partition.
The blocking mechanism we consider in our results depends on the
measure space of agents. We start, Section 3.1, considering continuum
atomless economies in which only a finite number of characteristics can
be observed. For such economies, the set of traders is partitioned into a
finite number of coalitions such that individuals belonging to the same
coalition have identical densities of initial bundles and final bundles,
the same random utilities, the same private information and priors.
We define the profile of a coalition as the finite dimensional vector that
valuates the weight of each type in the coalition. Then, starting from
the private blocking mechanism, we define the set of all blocking profile
for a fixed Pareto optimal allocation that is not a Radner equilibrium.
We show that for every profile pi in which the proportion of different
types in the same as in the whole society, almost half of the profiles
around pi are privately blocking. In particular, we extend to economies
with asymmetries results proved in Shitovitz [47].
In the case of finite differential information economies, Section 3.3,
the cooperative characterization of Radner equilibria via private core
notions is possible enlarging the coalition formation mechanism. The
notion of generalized (or fuzzy) coalition introduced by [7] allows to
show private core equivalence theorems even in finite and atomic case
(see [24], [31]). In this framework, we show that for a Pareto optimal
allocation of a finite differential information economy that is not a Rad-
ner equilibrium, to any symmetric fuzzy coalition there corresponds a
ball centered in the coalition such that “almost half” of the coalitions it
contains are privately blocking. Mainly the result follows from a suit-
able correspondence between blocking coalitions of the finite economy
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and blocking profiles of a continuum associated economy.
Finally, Section 3.4, we underly the rule played by information shar-
ing inside a blocking coalition. An appropriate notion of the core must
take account of whether the coalition decision stage is ex-ante, i.e., be-
fore the agents learn their types, interim, i.e., when every agent only
knows his own type, or ex-post, i.e., when all types are revealed publicly.
In Section 3.5, the analogous of Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.3.4 are inves-
tigated in connection with the notion of social coalition structure.
Following [23], we introduce for a finite differential information
economy a social coalition structure in the form of a finite set of gen-
eralized coalitions. A coalition can be formed if and only if it belongs
to the given structure. Moreover, any trader is required to redistribute
is initial endowment among the coalitions in the given structure. The
need of imposing a social coalition structure on the society is motivated
by the fact that, although many coalitions can block an allocation that
is not in the private core, it is not true that such coalitions will re-
ally formed. In particular, in economies with differential information,
the interest in such structures is connected with costs of communica-
tion and information that may reduce the possibility of free coalition
formation.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we have found a sufficient condition for the
equivalence between the following concept of supporting price:
* xi Âi x
∗
i implies p · xi ≥ p · x
∗
i ,
* xi Âi x
∗
i implies p · xi > p · x
∗
i .
where x∗i is the optimal demand for all i. Moreover, we prove an equiv-
alence result between:
* zi ºi xi implies p · zi ≥ p · xi,
* zi Âi xi implies p · zi > p · xi.
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Chapter 1
The Model and Main
Definitions
In this chapter we introduce the theoretical framework for studying
restriction on coalition formation. By one side, we will extend some
consolidated results in an economy with differential information related
to Core - Walras equivalence. By the other side, we will deal with
equilibria concepts for the economy E used throughout our study.
The organization of Chapter 1 is as follows. In Section 1.1 we set
the basic economic model, describing its component. In Section 1.2 we
furnish the basic definitions of the main part of the solution concepts
used throughout the work. Other concepts will be introduced when
required.
1
1.1 Economic Model
We consider a Radner-type exchange economy E with differential in-
formation that takes place over two time periods. At time t = 0 there
is uncertainty about the state of nature that is going to be realized. At
this period agents make contracts that may be available on the realized
state of nature at time t = 1. At the second period consumption takes
place. It is modeled by the following set:
E = {(ω,F); (T, σ, µ); IB+; (Πt, qt, ut, et)t∈T}
Following [40], the exogenous uncertainty is modeled by a measur-
able space (Ω,F), where Ω denotes a finite set of states of nature and
the field F represents the set of all events. The space of traders is de-
scribed by a measure space (T,Σ, µ), where T is the set of all traders,
Σ is a σ-field of all coalitions, the measure µ defines the weight of
each coalition on the market. With respect to the traders space, the
situations that will be significant in the sequel are those of finite and
continuum economies. The former will be characterize by µ to be the
counting measure over a finite set T of traders. The latter will be given
by a finite atomless measure space, typically the unit interval [0, 1] with
its Lebesgue measure.
The physical commodity space will be represented, in each state, by
an ordered separable Banach space IB whose positive cone IB+ is as-
sumed to have non empty norm interior. The dual space of IB, denoted
by IB
′
, will represent the price space.
The initial information of traders t ∈ T is described by a measurable
partition Πt ∈ Ω. We denote by Ft the field generated by Πt. If
ω0 is the true state of nature that is going to be realized, trader t
observes the member of Πt which contains ω0. Every trader t ∈ T
has a probability measure qt on F representing his prior beliefs, i.e.
probability conditioned by his information set.
The preference of a trader t ∈ T is represented by a state dependent
utility function, ut : Ω × IB+ → IR. In each state ω ∈ Ω and for all
t ∈ T , the function ut(ω, ·) : IB+ → IR is assumed to be continuous,
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concave and strictly monotone. Moreover, for all ω ∈ Ω the mapping
(t, x) → ut(ω, x) is Σ × B-measurable, where B is the σ-field of Borel
subsets of IB+.
The initial endowment of physical resources of a trader t ∈ T is a
specification of the quantity of physical commodities in each state of
nature. It is represented by a function e : T × Ω → IB+ such that
e(·, ω) is µ-integrable in each state ω ∈ Ω. By integral of the function
e(·, ω) : T → IB with respect to µ, we mean the Bochner integral as
defined in [14]. To represent the fact that traders do not acquire any
new information from their initial endowments, the function e(t, .) :
Ω→ IB+ is assumed to be Ft-measurable for µ-almost all t ∈ T . This
assumption implies, since Ω is a finite set, that it is a constant function
on each element of Ft. Finally, we shall assume that e(t, ω) À 0, for
µ-almost all t ∈ T and for all ω ∈ Ω. We remind that a vector v ∈ IB+
is strictly positive (v À 0) if for any non zero p ∈ IB
′
+, p · v > 0.
For any function x : Ω→ IB+, we will denote by
ht(x) =
∑
ω∈Ω
qt(ω)ut(ω, x(ω))
the ex-ante expected utility from x of trader t. It will represent the
agent’s utility function in the complete information economy associated
with E .
3
1.2 Definitions
In this section we furnish the definitions of the main concept analyzed
in our study for the economy E .
Specifically, we introduce here the two main equilibria concept used
throughout the paper: from a cooperative point of view, the concept of
private core and from the non cooperative one, the concept of compet-
itive private equilibria. All the definition stated at this level are pre-
sented in the unified framework represented by the basic model showed
in Section 1.1.
Definition 1.2.1 A feasible private allocation for the economy E is a
function
x : T × Ω→ IB+
such that
i) x(·, ω) is µ-integrable over T , for all ω ∈ Ω;
ii) x(t, ·) is Ft-measurable, for µ-a.e. t ∈ T ;
iii)
∫
T
x(t, ω) dµ ≤
∫
T
e(t, ω) dµ, for all ω ∈ Ω.
Condition ii) above is interpreted as informational feasibility of the
allocation x while condition iii) refers to its physical feasibility (see
[31]). Any function x : T × Ω → IB+ that satisfies conditions i) − ii)
is said to be a (private) allocation. When conditions i)− ii) refer to a
coalition S, we say that x is a private allocation over the coalition S.
The free disposability requirement contained in iii), is usually re-
quired to ensure the existence of Radner equilibrium allocations sup-
ported by non-negative prices (see [17]). This assumption is, generally,
not replaced in the main literature. See, for example, Yannelis [51],
Koutsougeras and Yannelis [36], Allen and Yannelis [5]. From a tech-
nical view point and economic mean, the assumption of free disposal is
required for the positiveness of prices for Radner equilibria, as showed
by Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis [21] and Einy and Shitovitz [18].
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Now, we turn to give the definition of cooperative solution concept,
the core, which differ with the information sharing rule used by agents
in a coalition. In an economy with differential information, the set
of allocation that a coalition can block depends upon the initial in-
formation and the communication opportunities of the members of a
coalition. In the main literature, there are three kinds of information
sharing rule in a coalition:
i) pooling information, introduced by Wilson [50], that is an alter-
native allocation that a coalition prefer must be enforced in an
event which they all can discern;
ii) private information, introduced first by Yannelis [51], such that
the set of feasible allocations for a blocking coalition must involve
a net trade of each member of the coalition that is measurable
with respect to his information partition;
iii) common knowledge information, that is net trades are measurable
with respect to the joint partition of all members of the coalition
and agents can discern only the events in the fine field.
Throughout our study, we have focused attention on the notion
of private core, which is non-empty under appropriate assumptions.
Moreover, if there is a finite number of traders, the private core is
coalitionally incentive compatible. In sections following, we will briefly
show some results related to the different cooperative concept discussed
above.
Definition 1.2.2 A coalition S ∈ Σ with µ(S) > 0 privately blocks an
allocation x : T × Ω → IB+, if there exists a private allocation y over
S such that:
i)
∫
S
y(t, ω) ≤
∫
S
e(t, ω), for all ω ∈ Ω;
ii) ht(y(t, ·)) > ht(x(t, ·)), for µ-a.e. t ∈ S.
The private core of the economy E , Cp(E), is accordingly defined as
the set of all feasible private allocations that are not privately blocked
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by any coalition. In other words, if it is not possible for agents to join
a coalition, redistribute their endowment among themselves and using
his own private information to obtain a strictly preferred allocation for
each member of the coalition The notion of private core, introduced in
[51], is the most appropriate when traders have no access to any com-
munication system, and are not able to share their own informations.
Definition 1.2.3 The feasible private allocation x : T × Ω → IB+ is
Pareto Optimal if it cannot be privately blocked by the full coalition of
traders.
It is clear that allocations in the private core are Pareto optimal.
The characterization of private core and Pareto optimal allocations in
terms of supporting prices is possible via the notion of efficient and
competitive prices.
Definition 1.2.4 A price system is a non-zero function p : Ω→ IB
′
+.
Let us introduce for any trader t ∈ T the set Mt formed by all
assignments reflecting his private information, that is:
Mt = {x : Ω→ IB+ : x is Ft-measurable}.
Definition 1.2.5 A non-zero price system p is an efficient price vector
for the allocation x : T × Ω→ IB+ if:
i) µ-a.e. in T the function x(t, ·) is the maximal element of ht in the
efficiency set
B∗t (p) =
{
z : z ∈Mt and
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · z(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · x(t, ω)
}
.
After the definition of price system for the economy E we can pro-
ceed to the non-cooperative context by furnishing the notion of com-
petitive private equilibria
Definition 1.2.6 Let p be a non-zero price system and x be a feasible
private allocation. The pair (x, p) is said to be a Radner equilibrium if
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i) µ-a.e. in T the function x(t, ·) is the maximal element of ht in the
budget set
Bt(p) =
{
z : z ∈Mt and
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · z(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · e(t, ω)
}
;
ii)
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·
∫
T
x(t, ω) dµ =
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·
∫
T
e(t, ω) dµ.
Usually condition ii) is not used in the definition of supporting
prices. We add it because the definition of feasible private allocation
allows free disposability.
Clearly, under an efficient or a competitive price system, agents
maximize ex-ante their expected utilities over their budget sets inde-
pendently one to each other. Moreover, given the structure of the sets
B∗t (p) and Bt(p), the notion of supporting price system takes into ac-
count the better information of an agent. Indeed, agents that are better
informed will be in general better off.
Definition 1.2.7 We say that a feasible private allocation x : T×Ω→
IB+ satisfies the smoothness assumption if, aside from scalar multiples,
there exists a unique efficient price vector p for x.
Throughout the paper there will be some technical modification of
this model, justified by a deeper analysis of an economy with differential
information and its equilibria concepts. In particular, in Chapter 2, we
consider a finite and measurable partition P = (R1, ..., Rk) of the grand
coalition, with k large enough. Starting from this partition we define
a new cooperative concept, which is more general.
In Chapter 3, we shall limit consideration to continuum atomless
economy in which it is possible to distinguish only finitely many differ-
ent traders’ types [47]. Precisely, we will assume that the set T can be
partitioned into a finite number of coalitions, S1, ..., Sm, such that
◦ e(t, ω) = ei(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ Si;
◦ ut(ω, x) = ui(ω, x),∀t ∈ Si, x ∈ IB+ and ω ∈ Ω;
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◦ Ft = Fi, ∀t ∈ Si.
Moreover, we will use different information sharing rules which inflects
consequences over equilibria measurability.
It is very clear, that the partition considered in Chapter 2 is more
general, and it includes the partition considered in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2
The Restricted Mechanism
of Coalition Formation
The restriction of coalition formation is inflated by incomplete infor-
mation. In an economy with N people, a person will only know the
preferences and endowments of a subset K ⊆ N of people and can
decide only to form coalitions with people from this group. There is
an upper maximum to the size of possible coalitions in the economy.
Moreover, another interpretation can be the presence of transaction
costs to coalition formation.
We want investigate how people can aggregate and form a coali-
tion. It becomes more real to think on a limit of the size of a coalition.
In other word, we take in account of some difficulties to join a coali-
tion. We consider an ²-core concept. We think about an economy with
uncertainty and differential information.
There are some consequences of placing an upper limit on the size
of possible coalitions. Intuitively the core will be larger. We call a core
with an upper maximum a restricted core.
The first study on this direction were made by Schmeidler [45], Vind
[49] and Grodal [27].
Schmeidler’s theorem [45] says that if we have a coalition S which
blocks an allocation x(t, ω) with an allocation y(t, ω), then we can
find an arbitrarily small sub-coalition E that can also blocks allocation
x with y. Thus, in an atomless economy, C(E) = C²(E) for any ².
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Schmeidler’s theorem is surprising for it says, in a continuum economy,
that the work that is done by huge coalitions can be also done by very
small coalitions.
Schmeidler’s original results were strengthened by Vind [49], he
demonstrated that if there is a coalition S which can block allocation
x with the allocation y, then not only there is a smaller coalition which
blocks that allocation, but we can find a smaller coalition of any size
to block it, i.e. for any δ where δ ≤ µ(S), we can find a coalition T of
size µ(T ) = δ that can block allocation x with allocation y.
Brigit Grodal [27] imposing a different type of restriction: she not
only restricted the size but also the composition of the coalition. She
restricted coalitions to a radius of neighboring agents, i.e. people with
similar preferences and endowments. She showed that we obtain the
same result for a continuum economy: any allocation x that can be
blocked by a coalition S can be blocked by a smaller coalition of less
diverse people.
Mas Colell [38] has attempted to give some economic interpretation
of this results. Specifically, he argued that we need not tether (link)
ourselves to credulity-stretching informational requirements of the ide-
alized notion of free Edgeworthian recontract. If whatever can be done
by a coalition, can be done by any arbitrarily small coalition, then one
only needs a few well informed people to take us to Walrasian equi-
librium. He also suggests that we think of these few as arbitrageurs.
With the rest of people in the economy remaining passive, it is enough
for this small, profit seeking group to do their duty and take us to
equilibrium.
In this section, we formulate and extend results of Okuda and Shi-
tovitz [39] in a differential information framework. Then, we can clas-
sifying core allocations with respect to the family of all coalitions that
include one of the members of partition.
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2.1 Restricted Process
We have remarked that the formation of a coalition may imply some
theoretical difficulties. It is not suffice to say that a coalition can be
formed by several agents. We must take into account all limits imposed
by society to the aggregation in coalition. It is very simple to thing that
agents are not free to form any coalition, especially in our framework.
In fact, it is usually argued that the costs, which arise from forming a
coalition, are not all negligible. Moreover, traders will form a coalition
only if they know each other. Incompatibilities among different agents
may arise and a big amount of information an communication might be
needed to form a coalition. Thus, it will be not enough to say merely
that several agents form a coalition.
We define a set of all possible coalition as the set of those coalition
that can be formed and joint by any agent. There exists, in this way,
a rule imposed over coalition formation. We assume that only a subset
S of Σ are allowed to be formed. In such way, we fix over the set of
agents a rule of aggregation for which the coalitions can be formed only
if belonging to this subset. We have restricted the set of coalitions that
can be joined by traders.
A coalition S is a measurable subset of T , such that µ(S) > 0 which
represents the size of coalition S. In the case of atomless economy, the
size of a coalition S can be interpreted, following [45], as the amount of
information and communication, or costs, needed in order to form the
coalition S. Then, may be meaningfully to consider those coalitions
whose size converges to zero or, symmetrically, to one; that is, the
coalitions that do not involve high costs can be formed.
The difficulty to argue that coalition formation is costless leads to
consider a restricted mechanism. That is, we restrict the set of coali-
tions considering a subset S ∈ Σ of all admissible coalitions. Following
[10], we introduce a new concept of core solution in a private framework
that we call S-private core.
Definition 2.1.1 Let S ∈ Σ be the subset of all admissible coalitions,
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with µ(S) > 0 for every S ∈ S. A feasible allocation x(t, ω) belongs
to the S-private core of E if it is not privately blocked by any coalition
S ∈ S.
We denote this core as S-Cp(E). This core concept is a generaliza-
tion of the core defined in definition 3.4.1. In particular, if S = Σ then
two concepts coincide.
In each coalition S belonging to the subset S agents do not share
their information, accordingly with definition of private allocation.
Traders joint a coalition which belongs to S, and they choose a pri-
vate allocation over S which improves upon the allocation x.
From the definition of S-core given S1, S2 ⊆ Σ we can easily infer
the following properties:
i) if S1 ⊆ S2 then S2-Cp(E)⊆S1-Cp(E);
ii) S1-Cp(E)∩S2-Cp(E) = (S1 ∪ S2)-Cp(E)
From the property i) it is deduced that if the private core is non-empty,
then so is the S-private core. The property ii) implies that if Σ =
⋃
i Si,
then
⋂
i(Si−Cp(E)) = Cp(E). That is, for any partition P of the whole
coalition set Σ the allocations belonging to the private core are those
allocations that belong to every S-private core, with S ∈ P , and the
intersection of the S-private cores of a partition P does not depend on
P .
In this framework, we can replace results of Schmeidler, Vind and
Grodal [1972]. The restricted mechanism we have defined above, in
fact, allows to formalize Schmeidler [45] result in terms of S-private
core. Vind’s result can also be formulated in terms of S- private core.
Precisely, if for almost all t ∈ T the preference relation ºt is continuous,
monotone and measurable, then S²-Cp(E) = C(E).
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2.2 Some new definitions
Given a fixed coalition R ∈ Σ, let
QR = {S ∈ Σ : R ⊆ S}
be the set of all coalitions which contain R. This structure define the
only coalitions that can be formed as those containing R.
Define with T\QR={S ∈ Σ : R ∩ S = φ}.
If P is any partition of the whole set Σ, then the allocation belonging
to the core are those that belong to every C(S) with S ⊆ P .
Now we define the appropriate core concept for these information
structure:
Definition 2.2.1 Let R be a fixed coalition. An allocation x(t, ω) is
said to belong to the R-inclusive private core if it cannot be privately
improved upon by any coalition S ∈ QR; i.e. if there is no coalition
S and an assignment y, F t-measurable, y : S × Ω → IB+ such that
R ⊆ S, µ(S) > 0,
∫
S
y(t, .)dµ ≤
∫
S
e(t, .)dµ and ht(y(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .))
for almost every t in S.
Definition 2.2.2 A feasible allocation x(t, ω) is individually rational
if ht(x) ≥ ht(e) for almost every t in T .
Definition 2.2.3 A non-zero vector p : Ω→ IB
′
+ is an efficient price
vector for the allocation x(t, ω) if µ a.e. in T , x(t, ω) is the
maximal element of ht over the efficiency set
B∗t (p) =
{
z ∈Mt |
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · z(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · x(t, ω)
}
.
We denote the cone of all efficiency price vectors for an allocation
x(t, ω) by
P (x,Ât ) =
{
p ∈ IB
′
+ : x Ât y ⇒
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · x(t, ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · y(t, ω)
}
and its linear dimension by r = dimP 1.
1As shown in Grodal [27], it is always true that the linear dimension of the cone P of
the efficiency price vectors r ≤ l, where l is the number of commodities in the market,
and that under classical assumption of differentiability and interiority r = 1
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We consider a finite and measurable partition P = (R1, ..., Rk) of
the grand coalition, with k large enough2. We have defined in the
previous section, the concept of R-inclusive core, or S-inclusive core.
We prove that an optimal allocation x belongs to the core if and only
if it cannot be improved upon by any coalition of the subset S that
includes at least one of the Ri.
Lemma 2.2.4 Let x(t, ω) be a strictly positive allocation for almost all
t ∈ T and for all ω ∈ Ω and let p be a non negative price, p ∈ IB
′
+.
Then (p, x) is an efficient equilibrium if and only if p · G∗(t) ≥ 0 for
almost all traders t.
proof: The first implication is trivial: if (p, x) is an efficient equilib-
rium, necessarily p ·G∗(t) ≥ 0.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a supporting price for the set
G∗(t). We want to show that x(t, ω) is the maximal element of the
efficiency budget set B∗t (p): i.e, all z(t, ω) such that ht(z) > ht(x) for
almost all t ∈ T does not belong to the efficiency budget set B∗t (p).
Suppose that z ∈ B∗t (p), then
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·z(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·x(t, ω). By
continuity, there exists α < 1 such that ht(αz) > ht(x) for almost all
t ∈ T , therefore,
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·αz(ω) >
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·x(t, ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·z(ω) ≥∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · αz(ω). Since α > 1,
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · z(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · x(t, ω) = 0.
But x(t, ω) À 0 for almost all t ∈ T , then p = 0 for almost all t ∈ T ,
which is a contradiction. Then, x is the maximal element of the efficient
budget set. ¤
Lemma 2.2.5 For a given allocation x(t, ω), let F be a set-valued
function such that G∗(t) ⊆ F (t) for almost all traders t. If p is a
non negative price such that p ·
∫
F ≥ 0, then
i) (p, x) is an efficiency equilibrium,
ii) p · f(t) ≥ 0 for all integrable selection f and almost all t ∈ T .
2We refer to Okuda and Shitovitz [39]
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proof: For each z(t, ω) ∈ ..., let G∗−1(z) = {t : z ∈ G∗(t)} be the
set of all agents t for which the allocation z belongs to the preferred
set. Define with G∗−1(x) = {t : ht(z + x) > ht(x)}, this set is measur-
able for each x. Let N be the set of all rational points r ∈ <l for
which G∗−1(r) is null. Obviously, N is denumerable. Define with S =⋃
r∈<l
G∗−1(r). Then S is a null coalition. Suppose that for some t /∈ S,
there is a bundle z(t, ω) ∈ G∗(t) with
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · [z(t, ω)− x(t, ω)] < 0.
By continuity, we may find a rational point r ∈ G∗(t) sufficiently close
to z,so that we still have
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · r < 0. Defined with A = G∗−1(r)
then µ(A) > 0. By desirability, for each ² > 0, we have an integrable
selection f = rχA + ²eχT\A from G
∗(t). Hence, f ∈ F (t). Therefore
0 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)·
∫
f =
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)·rµ(A)+²
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)·e(t, ω)µ(T\A) −→²→0
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)·rµ(A) < 0
a contradiction. Therefore,
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · G∗(t) ≥ 0 for almost all traders
t, and by Lemma 2.2.4, (p, x) is an efficiency equilibrium.
Let f be an integrable selection from F (t). Define with A ={
t :
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · f(t, ω) > 0
}
, then, for each ² > 0, the integrable func-
tion f = rχA+ ²eχT\A belongs to F (t). Therefore 0 ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·
∫
f =∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·
∫
A
f + ²
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · e(t, ω)µ(T\A) −→²→0
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·
∫
A
f .
Therefore,
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·
∫
A
f ≥ 0, which implies by the definition of A that
µ(A) > 0. This completes the proof of the Lemma.
¤
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2.3 The equivalence Cp(E) = S − Cp(E)
Proposition 2.3.1 Let x(t, ω) be an individually rational allocation.
Then x is supported by a price p (p 6= 0) if and only if x is a Pareto
optimal allocation.
proof: By contrary, suppose that x is not a Pareto optimal allocation.
Then there exists an allocation y : T × Ω → IB+, with y(t, ω) ∈ Mt
such that
∫
T
y(t, .) ≤
∫
T
e(t, .) and ht(y) > ht(x) for almost all t ∈ T .
For assumption, there exists a supporting price p : Ω→ IB
′
+ such that∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · y(t, ω) >
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · x(t, ω). By integrability,
∫
T
p(.) · y(t, .) >∫
T
p(.) · x(t, .) and y is feasible. The contradiction follows.
For the converse, we define a correspondence G from T in IB+ by
setting for all t ∈ Ri, G(t) = {z ∈Mt : ht(z(·)) > ht(x(t, ·))} and we de-
note by G∗(t) the correspondence defined by G∗(t) = G(t)−x(t, ·) ∀t ∈
Ri. Under classical assumption these sets are convex. We can define
the integral
∫
T
G∗(t) which is convex, and by Pareto optimal assump-
tion, we know that 0 /∈
∫
T
G∗(t). Therefore, by Separation hyperplane
Theorem, there exists a price p 6= 0 such that p ·
∫
T
G∗ ≥ 0, i.e. (p, x)
is an efficient equilibrium. ¤
Theorem 2.3.2 Let x(t, ω) be an individual rational allocation with
r = dimP and let P= (R1, ..., Rk) be a measurable partition of T . If
k ≥ r + 1, then x belongs to the core if and only if x belongs to each
Ri-inclusive core for all i, i = 1, ..., k.
The proof of our results needs the following result:
Theorem 2.3.3 Let x(t, ω) be an individual rational allocation and
let R be a fixed coalition whose complement T\R is atomless. Then x
belongs to the R-inclusive core if and only if there exists an efficiency
price vector p(ω) such that
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · x(t, ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · e(t, ω) for
almost each t in T\R.
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proof: For the proposition 2.3.1 x is a Pareto optimal allocation, than
x is in the R-inclusive core. Let us looking at the “only if” part. For the
proposition 2.3.1 and for hypothesis x is a Pareto optimal allocation
and there exists a price p such that (p, x) is an efficient equilibrium on
T .
Define with F (t) the correspondence:
F (t) =
{
G(t) for t ∈ R
G(t) ∪ [e(t, ω)− x(t, ω)] otherwise
where G∗(t) = {z(ω)− x(t, ω)|z(ω) ∈Mt and ht(z(ω)) > ht(x(t, ω))},
∀ t ∈ T . By Pareto optimality 0 /∈
∫
F (t).
From supporting Theorem there exists a price p : Ω → IB
′
+ such that∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·
∫
F (t) ≥ 0 and (p, x) is an efficient equilibrium. By mono-
tonicity , there exist a measurable and integrable selection f(t, .) =
(e(t, .) − x(t, .))χT\R + z(.)χR , with f(t, .) ∈ F (t) for almost all t ∈ T .
Therefore, by lemma 2.2.5 0 ≤ p ·f(t, .) = p ·e(t, .)−p ·x(t, .) for almost
all t ∈ T\R ¤
Let us try to give an interpretation. If we consider a partition of T into
two sets, namely R and its complement, non atomic, we will say that
an individually rational allocation, and in particular a core allocation,
belongs to the R-inclusive core if and only if it can be possible for
individuals belonging to T\R to chose the efficiency price vector p(ω),
in each state of nature, so that the value of their bundle is less than or
equal to the value of initial bundle. So that, despite of the measure of
the fixed coalition R, agents in R are not willing to leave this coalition
to join its complement and to gain.
Now we can show the demonstration of the main theorem:
proof: (Theorem 2.3.2)
Suppose that x belongs to each Ri-inclusive core. By theorem 2.3.3
there are efficient price vectors pi ≥ 0 for x, one for each Ri such that:∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω) · x(t, ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω) · e(t, ω)
∀ i = 1, ...k and for almost all t ∈ T\Ri. Such pi(ω) are linearly de-
pendent for all ω ∈ Ω, i.e., there exist α1(ω), ...αk(ω) not all vanishing,
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with
k∑
i=1
αi(ω)pi(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. Let I
+ = {j : αj(ω) > 0} and
I− = {j : αj(ω) < 0}. Since pi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., k, I
+ and I−are
both nonempty. Let us define P by
P (.) =
∑
i∈I+
αi(.)pi(.) =
∑
i∈I−
(−αi)(.)pi(.)
P is the competitive price vector for x. Indeed,
i) P is an efficient price vector for x since by definition P is a convex
cone.
ii)
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω)·x(t, ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω)·e(t, ω) for almost each t ∈ T . In fact,
let t be in T . Since (R1, ..., Rk) is a partition of T , there exists i0
such that t ∈ Ri0 . Assume, w.l.o.g., that i0 /∈ I
+. Therefore, for
every j ∈ I+, we have j 6= i0, in particular t /∈ Rj and therefore,
by definition of the pj(.), we have
∑
ω∈Ω
pj(ω) · x(t, ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
pj(ω) ·
e(t, ω). Since αj(ω) > 0 for j ∈ I
+, we have
∑
ω∈Ω
αj(ω)pj(ω) ·
x(t, ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
αj(ω)pj(ω) · e(t, ω). Summing over I
+, we obtain
the inequality
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω) · x(t, ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
j∈I+
αj(ω)pj(ω) · x(t, ω) ≤∑
ω∈Ω
∑
j∈I+
αj(ω)pj(ω) · e(t, ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω) · e(t, ω).
for almost each t ∈ T .
Now, by Theorem 2.3.3, x is a core allocation. ¤
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Chapter 3
The Measure of the Set of
Blocking Private Coalition
It is well known that in the case of finite economies that are “large
enough” or in the case of atomless exchange economies, the set of al-
locations for which blocking coalitions do not exist (core allocations)
coincides with the set of Walras (or competitive) allocations. As a
natural consequence, many authors have investigated the interesting
problem of valuating the number or the “proportion” of coalitions po-
tentially blocking a non competitive allocation. Mas-Colell in his paper
[37] showed that any Pareto optimal allocation which is “bounded away
from being competitive” in a differentiable pure exchange economy can
be blocked by a number of coalitions which is arbitrarily closed to one
half of the total number of coalitions. Related results in large finite
economies have been proved in Greenber and Weber [25] and Graziano
[23]. In the case of atomless economies, the problem of the measure of
blocking coalitions is investigated in Shitovitz [47] and Grodal [28].
Private core equivalence results proved in Einy et al. [17], Herve´s-
Beloso et al. [31] and [32], Graziano and Meo [24], show that in
economies with differential information the set of Radner equilibrium
allocations is equivalent to some private core notion. Consequently,
for any allocation that is not a Radner equilibrium, there exists a pri-
vately blocking coalition. Going further, we investigate the problem of
the measure of coalitions that privately block a non-competitive allo-
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cation. Related results in the case of economies with complete infor-
mation are covered by papers of [47], [25], [28], [23]. They all originate
from the question first raised in Mas-Colell [37], in which the author
asked for the number of coalition that blocks a certain given Pareto op-
timal allocation which is “bounded away from being competitive”. The
starting point there is the equivalence for finite economies between the
core and the set of competitive equilibria when the number of agents
is large enough.
The blocking mechanism we consider in our results depends on the
measure space of agents. We start, Section 3.1, considering continuum
atomless economies in which only a finite number of characteristics can
be observed. For such economies, the set of traders is partitioned into a
finite number of coalitions such that individuals belonging to the same
coalition have identical densities of initial bundles and final bundles,
the same random utilities, the same private information and priors.
We define the profile of a coalition as the finite dimensional vector that
valuates the weight of each type in the coalition. Then, starting from
the private blocking mechanism, we define the set of all blocking profile
for a fixed Pareto optimal allocation that is not a Radner equilibrium.
We show that for every profile pi in which the proportion of different
types in the same as in the whole society, almost half of the profiles
around pi are privately blocking. In particular, we extend to economies
with asymmetries results proved in Shitovitz [47].
In the case of finite differential information economies, Section 3.3,
the cooperative characterization of Radner equilibria via private core
notions is possible enlarging the coalition formation mechanism. The
notion of generalized (or fuzzy) coalition introduced by [7] allows to
show private core equivalence theorems even in finite and atomic case
(see [24], [31]). In this framework, we show that for a Pareto optimal
allocation of a finite differential information economy that is not a Rad-
ner equilibrium, to any symmetric fuzzy coalition there corresponds a
ball centered in the coalition such that “almost half” of the coalitions it
contains are privately blocking. Mainly the result follows from a suit-
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able correspondence between blocking coalitions of the finite economy
and blocking profiles of a continuum associated economy.
Finally, Section 3.4, we underly the rule played by information shar-
ing inside a blocking coalition. An appropriate notion of the core must
take account of whether the coalition decision stage is ex-ante, i.e., be-
fore the agents learn their types, interim, i.e., when every agent only
knows his own type, or ex-post, i.e., when all types are revealed publicly.
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3.1 The setting
The equivalence theorems for the set of Radner equilibrium allocations
and the private or the Aubin private core are the starting point of this
section. Given a Pareto optimal allocation that is not a Radner equi-
librium allocation, equivalence theorems ensure that there exists for
this allocation a privately blocking coalition (or a generalized coalition
in the case of finite economy). Our aim is to evaluate the measure of
the set of coalitions privately blocking the given allocation.
As we have defined in previous sections, we shall limit consideration
to continuum atomless economies in which it is possible to distinguish
only finitely many different traders’ types. For this purpose, we need
the following
Assumption 3.1.1 A private allocation x : T ×Ω→ IB+ satisfies the
finiteness assumption, if there exist the measurable functions xi ∈ Mi,
i = 1 . . .m, such that x(t, ω) = xi(ω) for each t ∈ Si and ω ∈ Ω.
The profile of a coalition S ⊆ T is defined as the vector
pi (S) ≡ (pii(S))
m
i=1 = (µ(S ∩ Si))
m
i=1
that evaluates the weights of the different types in the coalition S.
Let us denote by f = (f1., ..., fm), with fi = µ(Si) > 0, the profile of
the full coalition T . Due to the non-atomicity of the Lebesgue measure
µ, the set of all the profiles of coalitions in T is the closed interval
Π ≡ [0, f ] ⊆ IRm+ . We say that a coalition S is symmetric if there exists
α ∈ (0, 1), such that pi(S) = αf . Finally, we call the support of a
profile pi ∈ Π the set supp pi = {i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : pii > 0}.
For a given profile pi ∈ Π, let S be any coalition with pi (S) = pi.
Given a feasible private allocation x with the finiteness assumption, we
denote by E and X the functions defined on Π×Ω with values in IB+
defined by:
E(pi, ω) ≡
m∑
i=1
pii · ei(ω) =
m∑
i=1
pii(S) · ei(ω) =
∫
S
e(t, ω) dµ,
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X(pi, ω) ≡
m∑
i=1
pii · xi(ω) =
m∑
i=1
pii(S) · xi(ω) =
∫
S
x(t, ω) dµ.
We define a correspondence G from T in IBΩ+ by setting for all t ∈ Si,
G(t) = {z ∈Mi : hi(z(·)) > hi(xi(·))}
and denote by G∗(t) the correspondence defined by
G∗(t) = G(t)− xi(·) ∀t ∈ Si.
Note that G(t), G∗(t) e G∗(t)+IBΩ+ are all convex sets. Denote by G(S)
and G∗(S) the Aumann integrals of the correspondences G and G∗ over
the coalition S (see [14]). For any profile pi ≡ (pi1, ..., pim), denote by
G(pi) the convex set
G(pi) =
m∑
i=1
pii · {z ∈Mi : hi(z(·)) > hi(xi(·))} .
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3.1.1 Some preliminary “technical” results
Before establishing the main Theorems of the Chapter 3, we need some
preliminary results.
Lemma 3.1.2 Let S ⊆ Si be a coalition with µ(S) > 0, h : S × Ω →
IB+ be a function such that hi (h(t, ·)) > hi (xi(·)) for every t ∈ S.
Then the function
h¯(·) =
1
µ(S)
∫
S
h(t, ·) dµ
satisfies hi
(
h¯(·)
)
> hi (xi(·)).
proof: The statement follows from [31, Lemma 3.1]. Note that this
Lemma is stated for IB finite dimensional but its proof is valid for the
general commodity space considered here. ¤
We list in the following Lemma some properties of the correspon-
dence G(pi).
Lemma 3.1.3 The correspondence G : [0, f ]→ IBΩ+ satisfies the prop-
erties:
i) G(pi) = G(S), for any coalition S such that pi(S) = pi;
ii) G(αpi) = αG(pi), for any pi ∈ [0, f ] and α ∈ (0, 1);
iii) G(pi1) +G(pi2) = G(pi1 + pi2), for any pi1 and pi2 ∈ [0, f ] such that
pi1 + pi2 ∈ [0, f ].
proof: It is clear that G(pi) ⊆ G(S). To show i), consider an inte-
grable selection h of the correspondence G over the coalition S. Then
h(t, ·) ∈ Mt for µ-almost all t ∈ S and hi (h(t, ·)) > hi (xi(·)), for µ-
almost all t ∈ S ∩ Si, i = 1, . . . ,m. Denote by A the support of pi.
Then∫
S
h(t, ·) dµ =
∑
i∈A
∫
S∩Si
h(t, ·) dµ =
∑
i∈A
pii·
(
1
pi
∫
S∩Si
h(t, ·) dµ
)
∈ G(pi),
where the last inclusion follows from Lemma 3.1.2.
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The property ii) is obvious. Property iii) immediately follows from
the linearity of the sum, the concavity of the expected values and the
convexity of set Mi. ¤
Lemma 3.1.4 Let S ⊆ R be coalitions such that supp pi(S) = supp pi(R\
S). Then G∗(S) ⊆ G∗(R).
proof: Clearly the claim is proved if the support of S is empty. As-
sume that µ(S) > 0. Let a be an element of G∗(S) and denote by A
the set supp pi(S) = supp pi(R \ S). Lemma 3.1.3 allows us to write
a(·) =
∑
i∈A
pi · hi(·)−
∑
i∈A
pi · xi(·)
where hi(·) ∈Mi and Vi (hi(·)) > Vi (xi(·)), for all i ∈ A. By continuity
assumption, there exists ε ∈ (0, 1) such that Vi (ε · hi(·)) > Vi (xi(·)),
for all i ∈ A. Define an assignment k : R× Ω→ IB+ by means of
k(t, ·) =


ε · hi(·) t ∈ S ∩ Si, i ∈ A
xi(·) + wi t ∈ (R \ S) ∩ Si, i ∈ A
where
wi =
(1− ε) · µ(S ∩ Si)
µ ((R \ S) ∩ Si)
hi(·).
Then k is a private allocation over R and, by monotonicity, Vi(k(t, ·)) >
Vi(xi(·)) for µ-almost all t ∈ R ∩ Si, i ∈ A. Moreover,∫
R
k(t, ·) dµ−
∫
R
x(t, ·) dµ =
∫
R\S
k(t, ·) dµ+
∫
S
k(t, ·) dµ−
∫
R\S
x(t, ·) dµ−
∫
S
x(t, ·) dµ =
=
∑
i∈A
∫
(R\S)∩Si
k(t, ·) dµ+
∑
i∈A
∫
S∩Si
ε·hi(·) dµ−
∑
i∈A
∫
(R\S)∩Si
xi(·) dµ−
∑
i∈A
∫
S∩Si
xi(·) dµ =
=
∑
i∈A
∫
S∩Si
hi(t, ·) dµ−
∑
i∈A
∫
S∩Si
xi(·) dµ = a
that proves the desired inclusion. ¤
We say that a profile pi ∈ Π privately blocks an allocation x, if there
exists a coalition S with the given profile that privately blocks the
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allocation. By Lemma 3.1.3, a profile pi privately blocks an allocation
x if and only if the function E(pi, ·) : Ω → IB+ belongs to G(pi) + B
Ω
+.
This inclusion depends only on the profile pi. Therefore, the notion of
blocking profile is well posed since two coalitions with the same weights
in the different types behave in the same way.
We denote by K the subset of [0, f ] formed by all blocking profiles
for a given feasible private allocation x.
Proposition 3.1.5 K is a convex subset of [0, f ].
proof: First assume that pi ∈ K and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then, by Lemma
3.1.3, ii), E(αpi, ·) = αE(pi, ·) ∈ αG(pi) + IBΩ+ = G(αpi) + IB
Ω
+ and
αpi ∈ K. Again Lemma 3.1.3, iii) ensures that if pi1 and pi2 are blocking
profiles and pi1+pi2 ∈ [0, f ], then E(pi1, ·)+E(pi2, ·) ∈ G(pi1)+G(pi2)+
IBΩ+ = G(pi1 + pi2) + IB
Ω
+. Then pi1 + pi2 is a blocking profile and the
claim is proved. ¤
We say that the feasible private allocation x with the finiteness
assumption is strictly positive, or x À 0, if xi(ω) À 0 for each i =
1, . . . ,m and for each ω ∈ Ω. The next result furnishes a direct proof
of the Second Welfare Theorem for a Pareto optimal allocation in our
differential information economy with a finite number of types. Note
that an indirect proof would follow from [24, Theorem 5.2]. As usual,
the strict positivity assumption on the allocation x could be replaced
by irreducibility assumptions like those formulated in Einy et al. [17].
Proposition 3.1.6 Let x be a strictly positive Pareto optimal alloca-
tion with the finiteness assumption. Then there exists an efficient price
vector for the allocation x satisfying the additional condition
(?)
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·
m∑
i=1
fixi(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ·
m∑
i=1
fiei(ω).
proof: Define the convex set F ⊆ IBΩ by
F = G(f)− E(f, ·).
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By Pareto optimality of allocation x, the intersection F ∩IBΩ− is empty.
Applying one of the infinite dimensional versions of the separation the-
orem (note that both sets are convex and IBΩ− has non-empty norm in-
terior), we find a non-zero function p : Ω→ IB
′
such that p ·F ≥ p ·IBΩ−.
Since IBΩ− is a cone, p is non negative. Moreover, p · F ≥ 0. By conti-
nuity assumption,
p ·
m∑
i=1
fi · xi(·) ≥ p ·
m∑
i=1
fi · ei(·).
Then feasibility of allocation x ensures that condition (?) is satisfied.
Consider now a function z ∈ Mk such that hk (z(·)) > hk (xk(·)).
By monotonicity, for any i 6= k we find a function zi ∈ Mi such that
hi (zi(·)) > hi (xi(·)).
By concavity, for any α ∈ (0, 1), the function of Mk defined by
zk(·) = αzk(·)+(1−α)z(·) satisfies the inequality hk(zk(·)) > hk(xk(·)).
Concavity and monotonicity assumptions ensure that the functions
zi(·) = αzi(·)+(1−α)xi(·)+αei(·), for i 6= k, satisfy hi(zi(·)) > hi(xi(·).
Then,
p ·
(
m∑
i=1
fi · zi(·)−
m∑
i=1
fi · xi(·)
)
≥ 0.
The last inequality implies that for any α ∈ (0, 1)
α·
∑
i6=k
fi·p·(zi(·))+(1−α)·
∑
i6=k
fi·p·xi(·)+α·
∑
i6=k
fi·p·ei(·)+α·fk·p·zk+(1−α)fk·p·z ≥
∑
i6=k
fi · p · xi(·) + fk · p · xk.
Letting α goes to zero, we find that p · z ≥ p · xk. Assume now that
p · z = p · xk. Choose α ∈ (0, 1) such that hk (αz(·) + (1− α)xk(·)) >
hk (xk(·)). By strict positivity of allocation x, we get
p · (αz(·) + (1− α)xk(·)) < p · (αx(·)) + p · ((1− α)xk(·)) = p · xk(·)
and a contradiction. ¤
In a similar manner we can prove the next Proposition.
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Proposition 3.1.7 Let x be a strictly positive Pareto optimal alloca-
tion satisfying the finiteness assumptions. Then a non-zero function
p : Ω→ IBΩ is an efficient price vector for the allocation x if and only
if p ·
(
G∗(I) + IBΩ+
)
≥ 0.
proof: One implication is clear. Conversely, consider a non-zero func-
tion p : Ω → IB
′
such that p ·
(
G∗(I) + IBΩ+
)
≥ 0. Since IBΩ+ is a cone,
p is non-negative and p · (G∗(I)) ≥ 0. Now, with the same arguments
of Proposition 3.1.6, one shows that p is an efficient system of prices
for the allocation x. ¤
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3.2 Private core: the measure of the set K
In this section we state the main results concerning the measure of
blocking coalitions in a continuum economy with finitely many types.
Denote by B(a, ²) the ball of IRm with a as its center and radius ².
By λ the Lebesgue measure on IRm.
Theorem 3.2.1 Let x : T × Ω → IB+ be a strictly positive Pareto
optimal allocation that is not a Radner equilibrium allocation. Assume
that x satisfies the finiteness and the smoothness assumptions. Then
for any symmetric profile αof ∈ [0, f ]
lim
²→0
λ (K ∩ B(α0f, ²))
λ (B(α0f, ²))
=
1
2
.
We show Theorem 3.2.1 via a series of Lemmas.
Lemma 3.2.2 Let pi be a profile such that
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)·X(pi, ω) >
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)·
E(pi, ω), where p is the unique normalized efficiency price vector for the
allocation x. Then there exists ε0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for any ε ∈ (0, εo]
ε (X(pi, ·)− E(pi, ·)) ∈ G∗(I) + IBΩ+.
proof: Define the convex set B = {² (X(pi, ·)− E(pi, ·)) : ε ∈ (0, 1)}.
We claim that B has a non-empty intersection with the convex set
G∗(I) + IBΩ+. Assume on the contrary that B ∩
(
G∗(I) + IBΩ+
)
= ∅.
By separation theorem, there exists a q : Ω → IB
′
, ‖q‖ = 1, such that
q ·B ≤ q ·
(
G∗(I) + IBΩ+
)
.
Since 0 belongs to the closure of B, then q ·
(
G∗(I) + IBΩ+
)
≥ 0,
i.e., by Proposition 3.1.6, q is a normalized efficiency price vector
for x. Consequently, by smoothness assumption, q = p. Since 0
belongs to the closure of G∗(I) + IBΩ+, it is true that p · B ≤ 0,
that contradicts hypothesis. Then there exists εo ∈ (0, 1) such that
εo (X(pi, ·)− E(pi, ·)) ∈ G
∗(I) + IBΩ+. Finally, Lemma 3.1.4 ensures
that α
(
G∗(I) + IBΩ+
)
= G∗(αI) + IBΩ+ ⊆ G
∗(I) + IBΩ+ and the desired
conclusion. ¤
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Lemma 3.2.3 Let pi be a profile such that
ε (X(pi, ·)− E(pi, ·)) ∈ G∗(I) + IBΩ+
for ε ∈ (0, εo], where εo ∈ (0, 1). Then f −
1
2
εpi ∈ K.
proof: We show the statement for ε = εo.
It follows from
εo (X(pi, ·)− E(pi, ·)) ∈ G
∗(I) + IBΩ+
and Lemma 3.1.4, that
1
2
εo (X(pi, ·)− E(pi, ·)) ∈
1
2
(
G∗(f) + IBΩ+
)
⊆ G∗
(
1
2
f
)
+ IBΩ+ ⊆
G∗
(
1
2
f +
1
2
f −
1
2
εopi
)
+ IBΩ+ = G
∗
(
f −
1
2
εopi
)
+ IBΩ+.
By feasibility, X(f, ·) ≤ E(f, ·). Hence the inequality
E
(
f −
1
2
εopi, ·
)
−X
(
f −
1
2
εopi, ·
)
≥ X
(
1
2
εopi, ·
)
−E
(
1
2
εopi, ·
)
∈ G∗
(
f −
1
2
εopi
)
+IBΩ+
implies that
E
(
f −
1
2
εopi, ·
)
−X
(
f −
1
2
εopi, ·
)
∈ G∗
(
f −
1
2
εopi
)
+ IBΩ+
and the conclusion. ¤
Let C be a convex cone in IRm with full dimension and vertex co.
We say that a convex subset K ⊆ C satisfies the contraction property
with respect to C and co, if for any c ∈ C there exists δc > 0 such that
(1− δ)co + δc ∈ K for δ ∈ (0, δc].
Lemma 3.2.4 The set K of blocking profiles satisfies the contraction
property with respect to the symmetric profile αof and the cone C de-
fined by
C =
{
pi ∈ IRm+ : p ·X(pi, ·) < p · E(pi, ·)
}
,
where p is the unique normalized efficiency price vector for the alloca-
tion x.
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proof: Clearly the convex set K is contained in C. Let pi ∈ C be a
profile. By smoothness assumption and Proposition 3.1.6, p ·X(f, ·) =
p · E(f, ·) and hence p ·X(f − pi, ·) > p · E(f − pi, ·). By Lemma 3.2.2
and Lemma 3.2.3, there exists εo ∈ (0, 1) such that f −
1
2
εf + 1
2
pi ∈ K,
for each ε ∈ (0, εo]. Then, by a suitable εo ∈ (0, 1), (1− ε)f + εpi ∈ K,
for each ε ∈ (0, εo]. As in [47, Corollary 3] one can use this fact to show
that (1 − δ)αof + δopi ∈ K for any δ ∈ (0, δo] and then the Lemma is
proved. ¤
proof: (of Theorem 3.2.1) By Lemma 3.2.4 and [47, Lemma page
254], we can write that
lim
²→0
λ (K ∩ B(α0f, ²))
λ (B(α0f, ²))
= 1.
On the other hand, the set IRm+ \ C can be written as
IRm+\C =
{
pi ∈ IRm+ : p ·X(pi, ·) = p · E(pi, ·)
}
∪
{
pi ∈ IRm+ : p ·X(pi, ·) > p · E(pi, ·)
}
where the first set is an hyperplane and then has measure zero. By
smoothness and Proposition 3.1.6, p · X(αof, ·) = p · E(αof, ·) and
consequently p ·X(pi, ·) < p · E(pi, ·) if and only if p ·X(αof − pi, ·) >
p ·E(αof−pi, ·). Since the Lebesgue measure λ is translation invariant,
we find that
λ
({
pi ∈ IRm+ : p ·X(pi, ·) = p · E(pi, ·)
})
= λ
({
pi ∈ IRm+ : p ·X(pi, ·) > p · E(pi, ·)
})
and then
λ (B(αof, ε)) = 2λ (C ∩B(αof, ε))
that gives the desired conclusion. ¤
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3.3 The case of finite economies
The standard relations between core allocations and competitive equi-
libria in the framework of complete information economies, can be gen-
eralized to private core allocations and Radner equilibria of differential
information economies. It is easy to show that every Radner equilib-
rium is in the private core. Actually, it is possible to show that in the
case of continuum atomless economies, the private core coincides with
the set of Radner equilibria (see [17], [31], [24]). When the differen-
tial information economy E has a finite number of traders (or more
generally, when it admits atoms) private core allocations may not be
decentralized by prices. The notion of Aubin private core allows to
restore the equivalence. It is based on the following generalized notion
of coalition.
Definition 3.3.1 Define the set
A = {γ : T → [0, 1] : γ is simple, measurable and µ({t ∈ T : γ(t) > 0}) > 0} .
We call any element γ in the set A a generalized (or fuzzy) coalition
and the set {t ∈ T : γ(t) > 0} the support of γ.
The set A can be interpreted as a generalized coalitions in the sense
that γ(t) represents the share of resources employed by agent t in the
coalition γ. Ordinary coalitions form a subset of A since they can be
identified with their characteristic functions. In the case the set T is
formed by m traders, a generalized coalition is a vector (γ1, . . . , γm))
of [0, 1]m.
Definition 3.3.2 The coalition γ ∈ A of support A privately blocks
an allocation x : T × Ω → IB+, if there exists a private allocation
y : A× Ω→ IB+ over A s.t.
i)
∫
A
γ(t)y(t, ω) dµ ≤
∫
A
γ(t)e(t, ω) dµ, for all ω ∈ Ω;
ii) ht(y(t, ·)) > ht(x(t, ·)), µ-a.e. on A.
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The Aubin private core of the economy E is accordingly defined as
the set of all feasible private allocations which are not privately blocked
by a fuzzy coalition (see [24], [32]). Since the set of coalitions has been
enlarged with respect to the field Σ, the private core contains the Aubin
private core. It is easy to show that Radner equilibrium allocations are
in the Aubin private core. Conversely, [24, Theorem 3.1] ensures the
equivalence between the Aubin private core and Radner equilibria in
the case of the general measure space of traders treated here and hence,
in particular, in the case of finite differential information economies.
The main aim of this section is to extend the result of Mas-Colell on
the measure of blocking coalitions in a large economy with complete in-
formation, to generalized coalitions of finite economies with differential
information.
Let us consider a finite differential information economy E with
m traders as described in Section 1.1. Given a generalized coalition
γ : {1, . . . ,m} → [0, 1] with non-empty support, we say that γ is
symmetric if γ is a constant function, that is all traders employ the same
non-zero share of their initial endowments in the given coalition. We
denote by Kf the subset of [0, 1]
m formed by all generalized coalitions
that privately blocks a feasible private allocation x ≡ (x1, . . . , xm).
By a standard procedure, we shall associate to the finite differential
information economy E , a continuum differential information economy
Ec with a finite number of types.
Let us consider the m consecutive disjoint sub-intervals {S1, . . . , Sm}
of the real unit interval [0, 1] of equal length 1
m
, that is:
Ii =
[
i− 1
m
,
i
m
)
, if i 6= m and Im =
[
m− 1
m
, 1
]
.
We consider the continuum economy E c by assuming [0, 1] as the agents
space and:
e(t, ·) = ei, Ft = Fi, ut = ui, qt = qi, ∀ t ∈ Si.
To a feasible private allocation x ≡ (x1, . . . , xm) of E we associate
the feasible private allocation xˆ : T × Ω → IB+ with the finiteness
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assumption defined by
xˆ(t, ω) = xi(ω), t ∈ Si.
Denote by K the set of blocking profiles for the allocation xˆ.
Lemma 3.3.3 Let the set of blocking coalitionsKf be non-empty. Then
Kf = mK.
proof: Assume that the fuzzy coalition γ : {1, . . . ,m} → [0, 1] pri-
vately blocks the allocation x. Let us denote by A its support. Ac-
cording to Definition 3.3.2, there exist functions zi ∈Mi such that∑
i∈A
γi · zi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈A
γi · ei(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
and
hi (zi(·)) > hi (xi(·)) , ∀ i ∈ A.
Consider the coalition S of E c defined by S =
⋃
i∈A
[
i
m
−
γ(i)
m
,
i
m
]
. Then
pi(S) =
1
m
γ and pi(S) ∈ K. Indeed, denoted by zˆ the allocation of E c
with the finiteness assumption corresponding to z, we have that
Zˆ(
1
m
γ, ω) =
∑
i∈A
γi
m
· zi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈A
γi
m
· ei(ω) = E(
1
m
γ, ·), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
and
hi (zˆi(·)) > hi (xˆi(·)) , ∀ i ∈ A.
Conversely, consider a profile pi ∈ K, a coalition S with pi(S) = pi and
a feasible private assignment zˆ over S such that zˆ privately blocks the
allocation x¯. Define a feasible private allocation of the finite economy
E by means of
zi(·) =
1
pii
∫
S∩Si
zˆ(t, ·) dµ, i ∈ supp pi.
Then ∑
i∈A
pii · zi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈A
pii · ei(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
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and, by Lemma 3.1.2,
hi (zi(·)) > hi (xi(·)) , ∀ i ∈ supp pi.
It follows that pi ∈ Kf and then mpi ∈ Kf . ¤
If an allocation x of the finite economy E is not a Radner equilib-
rium, by [24, Theorem 3.1], it is not in the Aubin private core. Then
the set Kf of blocking fuzzy coalitions is non-empty.
Theorem 3.3.4 Let x : {1, . . . ,m} × Ω → IB+ be a strictly positive
Pareto optimal allocation that is not a Radner equilibrium allocation.
Assume that x satisfies the smoothness assumptions. Then for any
symmetric fuzzy coalition γ ∈ [0, 1]m
lim
²→0
λ (Kf ∩ B(γ, ²))
λ (B(γ, ²))
=
1
2
.
proof: The result follows from Theorem 3.2.1. Indeed, once we have
observed that the allocation xˆ is Pareto optimal and non competitive,
the result follows from Lemma 3.3.3 and the fact that the Lebesgue
measure λ is translation invariant, that is:
lim
²→0
λ (Kf ∩ B(γ, ²))
λ (B(γ, ²))
= lim
²→0
λ
(
mK ∩ mB( 1
m
γ, ²
m
)
)
λ
(
mB( 1
m
γ, ²
m
)
) =
= lim
²→0
λ
(
K ∩ B( 1
m
γ, ²
m
)
)
λ
(
B( 1
m
γ, ²
m
)
) = 1
2
.
¤
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3.4 Fine Core and Ex-post Core
In previous section we have analyzed the case of ex-ante decision rule.
Now, we briefly focus our attention on a new information sharing rule.
An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy with incom-
plete information depends on the amount of information that coalitions
can share. In particular we study a notion of a core that involving an
arbitrary information sharing.
We assume that by pooling their information, agents could discern
the events in the fine field. That is, when different agents in a coalition
have different information their opportunities to take blocking actions
jointly are necessarily contingent upon events which they can all dis-
cern.
The ex-post stage, where decisions are made after the information
state is known, is no different from a model with complete information.
In fact, in Einy et al. [16], the Ex-post Core of an economy E is defined
as all the selections from the core correspondence of the associated
family of complete information economies {E(ω)}ω∈Ω.
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz [16] provide conditions for the conver-
gence of the ex- post core to the set of fully revealing rational expec-
tations equilibrium allocations. Starting from a theorem of Vind [49]
that establishes that if an allocation is not in the core of an atomless
economies with full information, then it can be blocked by an arbi-
trarily large coalition, they assume that full information corresponds
to joint information of traders in an economy, then a sufficiently large
coalition can discern any state of nature.
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3.4.1 Ex-post blocking mechanism and equilibria
Remind that, as described above, F is a field of subsets of Ω. The
information of trader t ∈ T is described by a measurable partition Πt
of Ω. We denote by Ft the field generated by Πt. Since Ω is finite,
there is a finite subfamily (Fi)
m
i=1 of (Ft)t∈T such that for all t ∈ T
there is i ∈ {1, ...,m} with Ft = Fi.
For all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, we assume that the set
Ti = {t ∈ T |Ft = Fi}
is measurable and µ(Ti) > 0. In such way, the set {T1, ..., Tm} is a
measurable partition of the agents set T . Throughout this section we
will assume that
i) for all ω ∈ Ω,
∫
T
e(t, ω)À 0, which ensures that each commodity is
present;
ii) for all t ∈ T and ω ∈ Ω the function ut(t, ·) is continuous and
strictly increasing on IB+;
iii) F =
∨m
i=1Fi, which ensures that F contains no superfluous events
about which no trader has information and therefore cannot affect
anyone’s consumption decision.
In the rest of this section, E is an economy with asymmetric information
as described above. For any economy E and a state of nature ω ∈ Ω,
we will denote by E(ω) the complete information economy in which the
commodity space is IB+, the space of traders is (T,Σ, µ), and for every
trader t ∈ T , his initial endowment is e(t, ω) and his utility function is
ut(·, ω).
Definition 3.4.1 Let x be an allocation,let S ∈ Σ be a coalition and
let ω0 ∈ Ω. We say that an assignment y is an ex-post improvement of
S upon x at the state ω0 if
i) µ(S) > 0;
ii)
∫
S
y(ω0, t)dµ ≥
∫
S
e(ω0, t)dµ;
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iii) ut(y(ω0, t), ω0) > ut(x(ω0, t), ω0) µ-a.e. in S.
The Ex-post Core of E , denoted by Ex-PC(E), is the set of all feasible
allocation that are not blocked by any coalition in each state of nature
ω ∈ Ω the ex-post allocation of E .
Theorem 3.1 in Einy et al. [16] shows the non-emptiness of the
Ex-post Core under assumption of our model, and moreover that
Ex-PC(E) = {x ∈Mt|x(·, .ω) ∈ C(E(ω))∀ω ∈ Ω}.
If p : Ω→ IB
′
+ is a price system defined in 1.2.4, we denote by σ(p)
the smallest subfield G of F for which p is G-measurable. The atoms of
σ(p) are the elements of the partition of Ω generated by the function
p. The ex-post budget set is defined state by state
Definition 3.4.2 The budget set of a trader t ∈ T at the state ω ∈ Ω
with the price system p is given by
Bt(ω, p) = {z ∈ IB+| p(ω) · z ≤ p(ω) · e(ω, t)}
Note that is the ex-post budget set. We can also introduce the efficient
budget set state by state
Definition 3.4.3 A non-zero price system p is an efficient price vector
for the allocation x : T × Ω→ IB+ at the state ω ∈ Ω if:
i) µ-a.e. in T the function x(t, ·) is the maximal element of ht in the
efficiency set
B∗t (ω, p) =
{
z : z ∈Mt and
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · z(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · x(t, ω)
}
.
If G is a subfield of F , f : Ω → IB+ is an F -measurable function,
and t ∈ T , we denote by Et(f |G) the conditional expectation of f with
respect to qt. As stated in Theorem 4.5 by Einy et al. [16], we con-
sider the Rational expectation equilibria as the competitive equilibrium
concept coinciding with the Ex-post Core.
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Definition 3.4.4 Let p be a non-zero price system and x be a feasible
allocation. The pair (x, p) is said to be a Rational Expectation Equilib-
rium (REE) if
i) for almost every t ∈ T , x(t, ·) is σ(p) ∨ Ft-measurable;
ii) for all ω ∈ Ω and almost all t ∈ T , x(t, ω) ∈ Bt(ω, p);
iii) for almost all t ∈ T , if y : Ω → IB+ is σ(p) ∨ Ft-measurable and
satisfies y(ω) ∈ Bt(ω, p)∀ω ∈ Ω, then
Et (ut(., x(., t))| σ(p) ∨ Ft) (ω) ≥ Et (ut(., x(.))| σ(p) ∨ Ft) (ω),
pointwise on Ω.
A rational expectation equilibrium (p, x) is fully revealing if σ(p) =
F1.
We want to extend the results of Shitovitz [47], as in the previous
section, to our model with this new concept of competitive and co-
operative equilibria. It is very clear that in the definition of blocking
concept, the ex-post one is an extension state by state of the case of
an economy without uncertainty.
We replace the correspondence G as in the previous section by set-
ting for all t ∈ Ti. The properties of the correspondence are the same,
noting that G(t) is defined over the preferences of all agents. Moreover,
we define the profile pi for a coalition S in he same way and the sup-
port for such coalition as I(S) = {i ∈ {1, ...,m} |µ(S ∩ Ti) > 0}. We
say that a profile pi ∈ Π blocks ex-post an allocation x, if there exists
a coalition S with the profile pi that blocks the allocation at the state
ω0 ∈ Ω. In the same way, by Lemma 3.1.3, we will say that a profile pi
blocks ex-post an allocation x if and only if the function E(pi, ) belongs
to G(pi) + IB+
We denote by K(ω0) the subset of [0, f ] formed by all blocking profiles
at the state ω0 ∈ Ω, for a given feasible allocation. It is very easy
1The assumption of fully revealing equilibrium is needed for the equivalence result, [16].
Moreover, it is also required that each trader knows his state-dependent utility function,
i.e. his utility function is measurable with respect to his information field.
39
to recognize in K(ω0) for all ω0 ∈ Ω the set defined in [47], i.e. the
set of all blocking profiles in a complete information economy. In such
way, the results is proved without many difficulties. It will be more
interesting to focus our attention on a new convex set. We consider
the convex hull of all K(·) as C = co
{ ⋃
ω∈Ω
K(ω)
}
. This set is convex
and non empty. The propositions 3.1.6, 3.1.7 and lemmas 3.2.2, 3.2.3
hold with the set C.
Note that K(ω0) ⊆ C ⇒ K(ω0) ∩ B(α0f, ²) ⊆ C ∩ B(α0f, ²) and
µ[K(ω0) ∩B(α0f, ²)] ≤ µ[C ∩B(α0f, ²)], then lim
²→0
µ(C ∩ B(α0f,²))
µ(B(α0f,²)
≥ 1
2
.
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3.4.2 Fine blocking mechanism and equilibria
The difficulty that economies with asymmetric information raise stems
from the fact that agents evaluate bundles after they have received their
information and that not all of them have the same information. Wilson
[50] notes that when information is asymmetric it is not enough for each
member of a coalition to know that he prefers one allocation to another
in order for a coalition to improve upon the latter. It must be commonly
known by all members of the coalition that this is so. The requirement
that the improvement be common knowledge is needed because agents
necessarily learn that they are improving upon an allocation when they
are doing so and they must be willing to transact after they have learned
everything they learn.
When opportunities for communication are allowed on the other
hand the relevant information should be the initial information refined
by the information transmission that has taken place. Therefore a
coalition improves upon an allocation when it becomes common knowl-
edge among its members that they can enforce something better after
the permitted communication has taken place. Wilson’s Fine Core
takes this into account and allows for unlimited communication among
agents. As Wilson [50] notes the opportunities for communication may
disrupt arrangements for mutual insurance causing the emptiness of
the Core.
The definition of Fine Core presumes that traders can share their
information. A coalition blocks if it has a feasible allocation that is pre-
ferred by every member of the coalition in an event which the coalition
can jointly discern. In Einy et al. [16] it is established that the Fine
Core is a subset of the Ex-post Core of an economy with differential
information, it can be applied to any economy in which the state can be
identified by pooling the information of agents in some coalition with
an ex post objection. Then, the Fine Core is also related to the core of
a full information economy and to the rational expectation equilibrium.
Einy et al. [16] show that this is generally the case in an atomless econ-
omy with a finite number of states. The proof is based on the argument
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that in an atomless economy, if there is an objection in a certain state,
there exists an objection by an arbitrarily large coalition. With a finite
number of states it is then possible to construct such a coalition in
which the state can be discerned by pooling the private information
in the large coalition. The Fine Core allowing for arbitrary forms of
information pooling. In our framework, there are only finitely many
different information fields, and since we assume that full information
corresponds to joint information of traders in the economy.
For an allocation y to be a fine improvement upon x it should be
possible to redistribute the information initially held by the members
of the coalition in a way that nobody learns more than what can be
learned by pooling all the information nobody forgets what he knows
and that makes it common knowledge that y is strictly preferred to x.
Consider the economy E defined in the previous section. For every
S ∈ Σ let
I(S) = {i ∈ {1, ...,m} |µ(S ∩ Ti) > 0}
be the support of a coalition S, where the set Ti = {t ∈ T |Ft = Fi} is
measurable for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, and µ(Ti) > 0. Note that,
m⋃
i=1
Ti = T ,
i.e. (T1, ..., Tm) is a measurable partition of the agents set T .
Definition 3.4.5 An information structure for a coalition S ∈ Σ is a
family (Ht)t∈S of subfield of F such that for every subfield G of F the
set {t ∈ S|Ht = G} is in Σ.
We can define a scheme for sharing information among the members
of a coalition
Definition 3.4.6 A communication system for a coalition S ∈ Σ is
an information structure (Ht)t∈S for S such that, for all t ∈ S, Ft ⊆
Ht ⊆
∨
i∈I(S)
Ft.
In particular we consider a full communication system for a coalition
S, i.e. Ht =
∨
i∈I(S)
Ft.
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Let S be a coalition and let (Ht)t∈S be a communication system
for S. Since Ω is finite, there is a finite subfamily (Hi)
k
i=1 of (Ht)t∈S
such that for every t ∈ S there is 1 ≤ i ≤ k with Ht = Hi and for all
1 ≤ i ≤ k we have µ ({t ∈ S|Ht = Hi}) > 0
Definition 3.4.7 An event A ∈ F is called common knowledge for S
with respect to the communication system (Ht)t∈S if A ∈
k∧
i=1
(Hi).
In this framework we can give the definition of the cooperative equi-
librium concept.
Definition 3.4.8 An allocation x is a Fine Core allocation for the
economy E if there does not exist a coalition S, µ(S) > 0, an assignment
y : T × Ω → IB+, a communication system (Ht)t∈S for S and a non-
empty event A which is common knowledge for S with respect to the
communication system, such that:
i)
∫
S
y(t, ω)dµ =
∫
S
e(t, ω)dµ for all ω ∈ A;
ii) Et[ut(·, y(t, ·))|Ht] > Et[ut(·, x(t, ·))|Ht], on A for almost all t ∈ S.
We can observe that a coalition S can block an allocation x only in an
event A which is common knowledge for each member with respect to
an admissible communication system.
We say that a profile pi ∈ Π blocks an allocation x, if there exists a
coalition S with the given profile that blocks the allocation, with the
communication system(Ht)t∈S in the common knowledge event A.
By lemma 3.1.3, a profile pi blocks an allocation x for the event
A ∈
∧
S
Ht if and only if the function E(pi, ·) belongs to G(pi) + IB+ for
all ω ∈ A. We can note that this results is the same related to the
different framework defined because it depends only on the definition
of profile of a fixed coalition.
Now we can denote with K(A) the set of all blocking profile in the
fine sense with respect an event A ∈
∧
S
Ht, which is a convex set. Now
we can use the definition 1.2.3 for a Pareto optimal allocation, and it
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is very simple to replace the results. Moreover, because the relation
between the Fine ore and the Ex-post Core is known, it is clear that
lim
²→0
µ(K(A)) ∩ B(α0f, ²))
µ(B(α0f, ²)
≥ lim
²→0
µ(K(ω0)) ∩ B(α0f, ²))
µ(B(α0f, ²)
=
1
2
for all ω0 ∈ A and A ∈
∧
t∈T
Ht.
Wilson [50] proposed a new definition for a fine efficient allocation,
that is an allocation is fine efficient if and only if in each event of a full
communication system there is no allocation which each agent prefers
given his own information. Fine objections are based on events that
can be discerned by pooling the information of the members of the
coalition. The agents are cooperating on their own in Wilsons theory.
Objections emerge from coalitions. We can give this new
Definition 3.4.9 An allocation x : Ω × R → IB+ is fine efficient if
there does not exist, for each event E ∈
∨
t∈T
Ft, an allocation y such
that
i) Et
(
ut(·, y(·))|
∨
t∈T
Ft
)
> Et
(
ut(·, x(t, ·))|
∨
t∈T
Ft
)
for µ-almost all t ∈ T .
A fine efficient allocation is obtained from
∨
t∈T
Ft-measurable weights,
not all zero on any event, i.e. constant over the whole set of states. We
must define a fine efficient price system in such way
Definition 3.4.10 A non-zero price system p is a fine efficient price
vector for the allocation x on the event A ∈
∨
t∈T
Ft if µ-a.e. in T the
function x(t, ·) is the maximal element of ht in the efficiency set
B∗t (ω, p) =
{
z : z ∈Mt and
∑
ω∈A
p(ω) · z(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈A
p(ω) · x(t, ω)
}
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3.5 Social Coalition Structure and Differential In-
formation
In this section the analogous of Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.3.4 are investi-
gated in connection with the notion of social coalition structure.
Following [23], we introduce for a finite differential information
economy a social coalition structure in the form of a finite set of gen-
eralized coalitions. A coalition can be formed if and only if it belongs
to the given structure. Moreover, any trader is required to redistribute
is initial endowment among the coalitions in the given structure. The
need of imposing a social coalition structure on the society is motivated
by the fact that, although many coalitions can block an allocation that
is not in the private core, it is not true that such coalitions will re-
ally formed. In particular, in economies with differential information,
the interest in such structures is connected with costs of communica-
tion and information that may reduce the possibility of free coalition
formation.
Definition 3.5.1 In a finite differential information economy E with
m traders and for any integer j ≥ 2, we call a social coalition structure
any non-negative matrix Γ = (γkh) of dimension j×m such that
j∑
h=1
γkh =
1, for all k = 1, ...,m.
Each row of Γ represents a generalized coalition. The elements
γkh describe the levels of participations of trader k in any sub-coalition.
Then in a social coalition structure any trader is required to redistribute
in full his initial endowment.
Extending the notion of blocking social coalition structure intro-
duced in [23], we will say that the social coalition structure Γ privately
blocks a private allocation x if there exists at least one subcoalition of
Γ that blocks x.
For a fixed feasible private allocation x that is not competitive, we
denote with Πjf the set of social coalition structure of Γ and with K
j
f
the subset of Πjf formed by blocking social structures. For any integer
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j ≥ 2, we denote by Γj the symmetric social structure defined by γhk =
1
j
for all h,k.
In order to valuate the relative measure of social coalition structures
that privately blocks a non competitive allocation, we define a corre-
spondence between social coalition structures of the finite economy and
ordered partitions of an associated continuum economy. We extend in
particular [47, Result 2] to an atomless economy with a finite number
of types and differential information.
Let us consider an atomless differential information economy E c
whit a finite numberm of types, and a feasible private allocation x(t, ω)
with the finiteness assumption that is not a Radner equilibrium. For
an integer j ≥ 2 and for any ordered partition B ≡ (B1, ..., Bj) of T
into j coalitions, we define the profile of B as the vector of profiles
Π(B) ≡ (Π(B1), ...,Π(Bj)).
Definition 3.5.2 The profile Π(B) privately blocks the allocation x(t, ω)
if at least one of the profiles Π(Bh) (h = 1, ..., j) is blocking.
Let Πj be the set of all possible profiles of the ordered partitions
of T into j coalitions, and denote with K j the subset of ΠJ formed by
blocking profiles. Clearly, Πj and Kj can be considered as subsets of
IR(j−1)m. Denote by f j ≡ (f, ..., f) ∈ IR(j−1)m the vector of profiles of
the full coalition. Then Πj ⊆ [0, f j]. Following [23, Theorem 5.2] we
find
Theorem 3.5.3 Let x be a feasible private allocation that is Pareto
optimal and non-competitive. Assume that x satisfies the finiteness
and smoothness assumptions. Then, for all α0 ∈
(
0, 1
j−1
)
,
lim
²→0+
µ (Kj
⋂
B(α0f
j, ²))
µ (B(α0f j, ²))
= 1.
proof: As in [47, Result 2], one defines for h = 1, . . . , j, the sets
Kh =
{
pi ∈ Πj : p ·X(pir, ·) > p · E(pir, ·), r = 1, . . . , h− 1 and pih ∈ K
}
,
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Ch =
{
pi ∈ Πj : p ·X(pir, ·) > p · E(pir, ·), r = 1, . . . , h− 1 and p ·X(pih, ·) < p · E(pih, ·)
}
.
The set Kh (and Ch) are pairwise disjoint. Moreover any Kh is a subset
of the corresponding Ch. With the same arguments of Lemma 3.2.4, it
is possible to show that Kh has the contraction property with respect
to Ch and αof
j. Then
lim
²→0+
µ (Kh
⋂
B(α0f
j, ²))
µ (Ch
⋂
B(α0f j, ²))
= 1.
Since
⋃
hKh = Kj and the sets
⋃
hCh and Πj has the same measure
(see [47, Result 2]) the conclusion follows. ¤
Let us state the result for a social coalition structure of a finite
economy.
Theorem 3.5.4 Let x : {1, . . . ,m} × Ω → IB+ be a feasible private
allocation that is Pareto optimal and non-competitive. Assume that x
satisfies the smoothness assumption. Then, for all α0 ∈ (0, 1),
lim
²→0+
µ
(
Kjf
⋂
B(α0Γ
j, ²)
)
µ (B(α0Γj, ²))
= 1.
proof: Let us denote by xˆ the private allocation with the finiteness
assumption defined by x in the continuum economy E c associated with
E . We claim that Kjf = mK
j. Indeed, for any coalition structure
Γ ∈ Kjf let us denote by A1 the support of coalition γ1 contained in
Γ and by Ah the set
{
i :
h∑
r=1
γir 6= 0
}
, h = 2, . . . j. Then,
1
m
Γ is the
profile of the ordered partition
B1 =
⋃
i∈A1
(
i
m
−
γi1
m
,
i
m
]
, Bh =
⋃
i∈Ah
(
i
m
−
∑h
r=1 γ
i
r
m
,
i
m
−
∑h−1
r=1 γ
i
r
m
]
, h = 2, . . . j
and, as in the proof of Theorem 3.3.4, this profile blocks the allocation
xˆ. Conversely, it is clear that any profile Π(B) ∈ K j gives rise to a
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social coalition structure mΠ(B) ∈ K jf . Then by Theorem ... and
property of the Lebesgue measure we have that
lim
²→0+
µ
(
Kjf
⋂
B(α0Γ
j, ²)
)
µ (B(α0Γj, ²))
= lim
²→0+
µ
(
mKj
⋂
mB(α0
j
f j, ²
mj
)
)
µ
(
mB(α0
j
f j, ²
mj
)
) =
= lim
²→0+
µ
(
Kj
⋂
B(α0
j
f j, ²
mj
)
)
µ
(
B(α0
j
f j, ²
mj
)
) = 1.
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Remark 3.5.5 The assumption of smoothness on the Pareto optimal
allocation x that we made in the main Theorems is standard if we
look to economies with complete information. The uniqueness (aside
of scalar multiples) of the supporting price is guaranteed if at least
one preference relations is represented by a differentiable utility func-
tion. The uniqueness of supporting prices in infinite dimensional setting
again follows from differentiability of at least one utility function (see
[8] for a discussion of this topic). In the case of economies with dif-
ferential information, the smoothness assumption is satisfied if ui(·, ω)
is differentiable in each state ω ∈ Ω, given the form of the expected
value.
Remark 3.5.6 Notice that, differently from results proved in [23] for
complete information economies, we assume in the paper that the com-
modity space has non-empty norm interior. Indeed, in presence of dif-
ferential information, properness assumptions on preferences used in
[23] to compensate for the lack of interior points, do not work. This
is true in general for private core equivalence results (see [24, Remark
5.6].
¤
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Chapter 4
Some Remarks on the
Second Welfare Theorem
The second fundamental welfare theorem (SWT) gives conditions under
which a Pareto optimal allocation can be supported by an equilibrium
price. It tells us that we can achieve any desired Pareto optimal allo-
cation as a market equilibrium. In an Economy with a finite number
of agents, characterized by a consumption set that coincides with the
positive orthant, it’s sufficient the convexity of the preference to guar-
antee the theorem. The convexity assumption plays a central role in
this theorem. But, the interpretation of the second welfare theorem is
strongest when the number of economic agents become large, because
the price-taking assumption is most realistic. We now observe that,
the second welfare theorem can be viewed as a special case of the ex-
istence of a Walrasian equilibrium for economies in which endowments
are distributed in a particular manner.
Proposition 4.0.7 If
∀ i Xi ⊂ R
l
+ is convex;
∀ i xi, x
′
i, x
′′
i ∈ Xi, x
′′
i Âi x
′
i ⇒ (1− t)x
′′
i + txi Âi x
′
i ∀ 0 < t < 1;
∀ ºi are continuous,
then, any Pareto optimal allocation (x0i )
m
i=1 is supported by a price p
s.t: ∀ i, xi ∈ Xi, xi ºi x
0
i ⇒ p · xi ≥ p · x
0
i .
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Under the classical assumption on the agents’ preferences (contin-
uous, convex, strongly monotone, and locally non satiated), and if the
initial endowments are strictly positive for all the agents (ei À 0) the
existence of walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed. So, now we can show
that the SWT is a particular case of this existence result. To see this,
suppose that x = (x1, ..., xm) is a Pareto optimal allocation of a pure
exchange economy, then a Walrasian equilibrium (p, xˆ) existS for the
economy in which endowments are ∀ i ei = xi. In fact, xˆ ºi xi , and xi
is affordable at price p for every consumer i. It follows, from the Pareto
optimality of x, that xˆ ∼i xi ∀i. But since xˆi is the optimal demand
given prices p, p · ei = p · xˆi = p · xi, xi must be an optimal demand for
consumer i for price p. Hence, the price vector p support the allocation
x . The SWT insures us on the existence of a supporting hyperplane
for a given Pareto optimal allocation. From the First welfare theorem
we know that if xi Âi x
∗
i then p ·xi > p ·x
∗
i , and it’s easy to verify that,
under the same assumption, p ·xi ≥ p ·x
∗
i . Now we provides a sufficient
condition under which the condition “xi Âi x
∗
i implies p · xi ≥ p · x
∗
i ”
is equivalent to preference maximization condition “xi Âi x
∗
i implies
p · xi > p · x
∗
i ”.
Proposition 4.0.8 Assume that Xi is convex and ≥i is continuous.
Suppose, also, that the consumption vector x∗i ∈ Xi, the price vector
p are such that xi Âi x
∗
i implies p · xi ≥ p · ei. Then, if there is a
consumption vector x′i ∈ Xi such that p · x
′
i < p · ei, it follows that
xi Âi x
∗
i implies p · xi > p · ei.
proof: Assume that p ·x∗i = p ·ei. Suppose by the contrary that there
is an xi Âi x
∗
i with p·xi = p·ei. By the cheaper point assumption, there
exist an x′i ∈ Xi such that p ·x
′
i < p ·ei. Then, for all α ∈ [0, 1(, we have
αxi + (1− α)x
′
i ∈ Xi and p · αxi + (1− α)x
′
i < p · ei. But, if α is close
enough to 1, the continuity of ºi implies that αxi + (1 − α)x
′
i Âi x
∗
i ,
which is a contradiction because we have found a consumption bundle
that is preferred to x∗i and costs less.
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Moreover, if x∗i = ei, then the proposition 4.0.8 gives a sufficient
conditions for the equivalence between this two problems:
x∗i minimizes the expenditure in the set {xi ∈ Xi : xi º x
∗
i }
and
x∗i maximizes ºi in the budget set {xi ∈ Xi : p · xi ≤ p · x
∗
i }
¤
Turn now to the case of an economy with a large number of con-
sumers. It’s well known the equivalence result between the core alloca-
tions and the walrasian equilibrium. In particular, the asserting that
the core allocations are Walrasian constitutes a version of the SWT.
Our interest is in economy with differential information. In par-
ticular, we give our attention to the characterization of Radner equi-
librium allocations as those random consumption plans which are not
blocked by grand coalition. In fact, if the initial endowments is such
that ei = xi ∀i, the SWT is a particular case of the equivalence theo-
rem. We can observe that, with this hypothesis, the economy E(a, x)
is equivalent to the economy E(0, x), and xi is its endowments for all
agents. So xi is a Pareto optimal allocation such that
∑
i xi =
∑
i ei,
and it is not blocked by grand coalition. It is not so hardly to prove
that an equivalent result is true for economies with a continuum of
agents.
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4.1 Supporting Price
In the previous section, we have found a sufficient condition for the
equivalence between the following concept of supporting price:
* xi Âi x
∗
i implies p · xi ≥ p · x
∗
i ,
* xi Âi x
∗
i implies p · xi > p · x
∗
i .
where x∗i is the optimal demand for all i. Now we want to prove an
equivalence result between:
* zi ºi xi implies p · zi ≥ p · xi,
* zi Âi xi implies p · zi > p · xi.
We focus our attention on two cases: the first (a), the consumption
set Xi ≡ R
l
+; the second (b), instead, the consumption set, Xi, differs
among the agents.
For our proof, is necessary to look at the result present in Debreu
1954 on these propositions:
Proposition 4.1.1 Under classical assumption on preferences and on
consumption sets, with every Pareto optimum (x0i )
m
i=1, where some x
0
i
is not a saturation point, is associated a continuous linear price p such
that, for every i
xi ∈ Xi, xi ºi x
0
i ⇒ p · xi ≥ p · x
0
i
Definition 4.1.2 Let p a linear continuous function. (x0i )
m
i=1 is an
equilibrium with respect to p if:
i) (x0i )
m
i=1 is attainable;
ii) For every i, xi ∈ Xi, p · xi ≥ p · x
0
i ⇒ xi ºi x
0
i
We want to show that, under the classical assumption on convexity
of Xi and of the preference relation, if there is, for every i, an x
′
i ∈ Xi
such that p · x′i < p · x
0
i , then 4.1.1 implies 4.1.2
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proof: Consider an xi ∈ Xi s.t. p·xi ≤ p·x
0
i . Let xi(t) = (1−t)xi+tx
0
i .
For all t, 0 < t < 1, p ·xi(t) ≤ p ·x
0
i , and thus, by 4.1.1, x
0
i Â xi(t). For
t converging to 0, follows that x0i º xi(t).
With these results in mind, we can prove:
Case a
Consider z, x ∈ <l+, z Âi xi ∀ i⇒ p · z > p · xi. For the convexity,
for all 0 < t < 1, tz + (1− t)xi Âi xi
1 ⇒ tp · z + (1− t)p · xi > p · xi.
As t→ 0, we have the assert.
Consider, now, z, x ∈ <l+, z ºi xi ⇒ p·z ≥ p·xi. For the convexity
and for the locally non satiation, there always exists a strictely preferred
bundle. Thus, given y 6= 0 ∈ <l+, z + y Âi xi and p · z + p · y > p · xi.
Case b
Consider z, x ∈ Xi, Xi convex and closed set. From continuity of
preferences and from convexity of Xi, if z Âi xi ∀ i, there exists an
α ∈ (0, 1] such that αz+(1−α)xi Âi xi. As α→ 0, we have the assert.
Consider z, x ∈ Xi, z ºi xi implies p · z ≥ p · xi. Inlight proposition
4.0.8, if there exists a gi ∈ Xi, p · g < p · xi, with xi = ei, we can write
that gi º xi ∀i. By this, the contradiction, because if gi º xi, then
p · g ≤ p · xi. ¤
1For the completness of the preferences, we know that if x Â x′ then x º x′.
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4.1.1 Considerations on Cheaper Consumption
Finally, we want to appoint some consideration on the existence of
cheaper bundle. First, we can note that closeness, convex assumptions
on the consumption set Xi, and the locally nonsatiation of the prefer-
ences ensure us on the nonemptyness of Xi. But, for the existence of a
cheaper bundle is not suffice.
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